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Abstract 
This paper provides estimates of the influence that changes in educational homogamy 
had on changes in inequality between households. Data from the Luxembourg Income 
Studies was employed for 20 European countries plus the United States to estimate 
income inequality under various simulated counterfactual scenarios. Earlier research 
found a very limited impact of changes in educational homogamy for a handful of 
countries. This finding extended to almost all countries studied in this paper. In a quest to 
explain this limited influence of changes in educational homogamy on changes in 
inequality, the validity of two hypotheses was scrutinized. Firstly, changes in educational 
homogamy might not have been big enough to considerably affect inequality. Secondly, 
women’s education might still be a relatively weak predictor of their earnings, reducing 
the relevance of partnering based on education for inequality between households. 
Partial support was found for the first hypothesis only. Extreme changes in educational 
homogamy were simulated to have a considerable impact on inequality in some 
countries, but not in others. This potential impact of educational homogamy was 
systematically lower in countries with high levels of female labor force participation, a 
factor that reduced the correlation between women’s education and women’s individual 
income. 
Key Words: Homogamy; Inequality; Social Stratification; Partnering; Social 
Demography; Family 
Boertien, D., & Permanyer, I. (2017). Educational assortative mating as a determinant of 
changing household income inequality: A 22-country study (No. 719). LIS Cross-







The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research 
Council (ERC-2014-StG-637768, EQUALIZE project). Iñaki Permanyer has also been 
supported by the “Ramón y Cajal” Research Grant Program (RYC-2013-14196) and 
Diederik Boertien by the Beatriu de Pinos program of the Generalitat de Catalunya 
(2016-BP-00121). 
Acknowledgement:  
We would like to thank Sander Wagner, Deirdre Bloome, attendants at the ECSR 
Conference in Milano, the Leuven conference on Changing Families, and the PAA 
annual meeting 2018 for their helpful suggestions and comments. 
Short bios: 
Diederik Boertien is a post-doctoral researcher at the Centre d’Estudis Demográfics 
within the EQUALIZE project. The main topics he works on are social demography, 
family, and social stratification. His research has been published in journals such as the 
European Sociological Review, Journal of Marriage and Family, and the European 
Journal of Population. 
Iñaki Permanyer is a Ramón y Cajal research fellow working in the Center for 
Demographic Studies (CED) since 2010. He has been awarded with several research 
grants, like the Fulbright Fellowship, the Juan de la Cierva and the Ramón y Cajal 
fellowships and, more recently, a Starting Grant from the European Research Council. He 
has more than twenty publications in top field journals like the Journal of Development 





Educational assortative mating as a determinant of household income inequality: A 
21-country study 
There are several ways of gaining access to income. Firstly, individuals can generate 
income through the labor market, investments, or by qualifying for welfare benefits. 
Secondly, individuals can find a partner and gain access to her or his income too (if 
income is shared). As a major route to income, partnering behavior is therefore likely to 
be a key source of income inequality between households. In this regard, socioeconomic 
homogamy within couples has been regarded as a potentially important determinant of 
income inequality (Blossfeld, 2009; Schwartz, 2013). If resourceful individuals form 
couples together, and people without resources partner each other too, inequality between 
households is expected to be higher compared to a situation where partnerships are 
formed across those groups.  
Previous studies on a small set of countries have aimed to empirically test this argument 
by studying to what extent changes in inequality can be accounted for by changes in 
partner matching based on education, an important socioeconomic marker (i.e. Denmark, 
Breen and Andersen, 2012; Norway, Eika et al., 2014; the UK, Breen and Salazar, 2010; 
and the US, Breen and Salazar, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 2014). 
Surprisingly, these studies found that changes in educational homogamy have had little 
impact on earnings or income inequality between households (Breen and Salazar, 2010; 
2011; Breen and Andersen, 2012). Two main reasons have been proposed for this limited 
influence (Schwartz 2013). Firstly, changes in educational homogamy might have been 
too small to affect income inequality. Secondly, women’s education might still be a 
relatively weak predictor of their earnings, as many women still exit the labor market 
when they become mothers.  
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In this article we aim to contribute to the literature on several fronts. Firstly, we 
investigate whether the conclusion of a limited influence of changes in educational 
homogamy on inequality can be generalized to more contexts by studying 20 European 
countries plus the United States. We use data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) 
to estimate the contribution of changes in educational homogamy
1
 to household income 
inequality across various decades (from the 1970s to the 2010s, depending on the 
country). We find that changes in educational homogamy have had a negligible to small 
effect on changes in income inequality across the period studied (the same conclusion 
was reached once looking at earnings inequality).   
Secondly, we test the validity of the different hypotheses that have been proposed to 
explain this limited influence of homogamy. We find that extreme changes in homogamy 
could affect inequality to a considerable extent in some countries, but less so in others. 
We do not find support for the hypothesis that it is the weak influence of women’s 
education on their earnings that limits the possible influence of changes in homogamy on 
inequality. Instead, higher levels of female labor force participation appear to limit the 
potential influence of educational homogamy. The positive correlation between women’s 
education and women’s personal income is systematically smaller in countries where 
many women participate in the labor market. We therefore conclude that future changes 
in homogamy are expected to have an even smaller impact on income inequality under 
the assumption that female labor force participation converges to high levels across 
countries.   
Educational homogamy among partners and inequality 
Research on the influence of partnering behavior on inequality forms part of a larger 
literature documenting the role of family dynamics including family structure, female 
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employment and the association between partners’ earnings (Bouchet-Valat, 2017; 
Esping-Andersen, 2007; Kollmeyer, 2012; McLanahan and Percheski, 2008; Western et 
al., 2008). Among these factors, the influence of the correlation between partners’ 
earnings on inequality appears especially large (Frémeaux and Lefranc, 2015; Schwartz, 
2013).  Changes in the association between partners’ earnings could explain between 
20% and 50% of changes in earnings inequality over time in the United States (Schwartz, 
2010). This observation provokes the question whether a range of family dynamics 
including the selection of partners and processes that take place after union formation 
(e.g. the division of labor) matter for changes in inequality (Gonalons-Pons and Schwartz, 
2017).  
Education is one of the major characteristics individuals select their partners on 
(Blossfeld and Timm, 2003; Blossfeld, 2009), and is also a major predictor of earnings 
and income. A concentration of education within couples is therefore likely to translate 
into a concentration of economic resources within couples. Many studies of the impact of 
changes in homogamy on inequality have therefore focused on educational homogamy 
(Breen and Andersen, 2012; Eika et al., 2014; Breen and Salazar, 2010; Breen and 
Salazar, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 2014). The evidence so far suggests, 
however, that changes over time in educational homogamy have had a negligible effect 
on inequality between households.
2  
Two main factors have been proposed that could determine - and hence limit - the 
influence of changes in homogamy on inequality (Schwartz, 2013). Firstly, its impact on 
inequality depends on how dramatic changes in educational homogamy are. There is 
quite some debate as to whether individuals have become increasingly more likely to 
partner someone similar to themselves in terms of education or not. For the US, some 
scholars have argued that educational homogamy increased (Schwartz and Mare, 2005) 
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whereas Rosenfeld (2008) argued that it has remained relatively stable over time. Trends 
in educational homogamy within European countries appear equally unclear (Blossfeld 
and Timm, 2003; Blossfeld, 2009), and a recent study even suggested that it has declined 
(De Hauw et al, 2017). If that is the case, inequality might have increased over the last 
decades despite decreases in educational homogamy.  
A possible lack of major changes in educational homogamy has been proposed as a first 
hypothesis why studies so far have found little impact of changes in educational 
homogamy on inequality (Schwartz, 2013). Breen and Salazar (2011) tested this 
hypothesis by simulating whether extreme changes in homogamy could affect earnings 
inequality within the context of the early 2000s in the United States. They concluded that 
even if no association between partners’ levels of education existed or if homogamy were 
at its highest possible level, inequality would barely differ from the actual observed levels 
of inequality. This finding, however, is at odds with what Eika and others (2014) as well 
as Harmenberg (2014) concluded for income inequality in the US based on similar 
methods. They documented that in the situation of random partner matching based on 
education, income inequality would be slightly but non-negligibly lower than observed. 
For other countries, evidence on the possible contribution of educational homogamy to 
inequality is non-existent, with the exception of Norway (Eika et al., 2014) for which a 
small contribution of educational homogamy to income inequality was documented.  
A second factor that determines the contribution of changes in educational homogamy to 
inequality is the extent to which educational homogamy leads to a concentration of 
income within households. It is widely documented that both educated men and women 
have higher earnings and income, but whether educational homogamy matters for 
inequality depends to a great extent on how partners adjust their labor supply based on 
their partners’ education (Breen & Salazar, 2009; Schwartz, 2010). In this regard, the 
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general level of female labor force participation matters. If women do not contribute to 
household income at all, it will not matter which women partner which men. It can 
therefore be expected that the more women contribute to household income the more 
relevant who partners whom becomes (Sudo, 2017). However, the extent to which 
women’s individual income makes educational homogamy matter for inequality not only 
depends on how many women contribute to household income but also whether women’s 
employment and income are stratified by education (Breen & Salazar, 2009; Schwartz, 
2010). If only lower educated women are employed educational homogamy is likely to 
have a suppressing effect on inequality between households, as women’s employment is 
an extra source of income only for households with lower levels of education. On the 
other extreme, if only higher educated women work educational homogamy is likely to 
amplify inequality.  
It has been hypothesized by Schwartz (2013) that a relatively weak association between 
women’s education and their earnings could have been responsible for the limited 
influence of changes in educational homogamy found so far. In line with this hypothesis, 
Breen and Salazar (2011) documented that educational homogamy within couples can 
only explain a small part of the correlation in earnings between partners in the United 
States. Whether this due to the limited influence of women’s education specifically, and 
whether this holds for other countries remains unclear.  
In which contexts would one expect a strong positive correlation between women’s 
education and individual income, and hence a high concentration of income within 
households due to educational homogamy? If a (partial) retreat from the labor market 
after childbearing is a major factor determining female labor force participation and 
women’s income, factors that facilitate combining work and family life are likely to be 
crucial (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Stier et al., 2001). In a context where mother’s 
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participation in the labor market is not facilitated, female labor force participation might 
primarily be driven by economic need (Eggebeen & Hawkins, 1990). In situations where 
mothers’ employment is more common, factors such as access to maternity leaves, 
childcare, and the division of household labor matter for how many and which women 
work. For instance, if good quality childcare is only purchasable in the market at a high 
price, combining work and family life might only be feasible for higher educated women 
(Esping-Andersen, 2009; Stier et al., 2001).  
Our Study 
The current evidence documenting a limited influence of changes in educational 
homogamy on inequality is based on a small set of countries (Denmark, Norway, the UK 
and the US). It is therefore unclear whether this conclusion is generally applicable across 
contexts. Our first main research question is therefore: Does the result of a limited 
influence of changes in educational homogamy on inequality extend to a wide set of 
European countries? This question is relevant as two factors that are expected to 
determine the impact of changes in educational homogamy on inequality differ across 
contexts: the extent to which educational homogamy changed over time and how 
important women’s education is for their earnings and income. Hypotheses regarding the 
importance of these factors have only been tested for the United States in the first case, 
and not at all for the latter. In addition, simulations of extreme changes in homogamy 
have concentrated on scenarios of zero or maximum homogamy. But, educational 
homogamy has the potential to reduce inequality between households if partnerships are 
formed across educational groups; in other words if hyper- and hypogamy increase. 
Given that women are increasingly more likely to ‘marry down’ (Esteve et al., 2012; 
2016), this is an important new scenario to consider. The questions addressed here are 
therefore: Would extreme changes in homogamy affect inequality? How about increases 
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in hyper-and hypogamy? Would educational homogamy matter more if women’s 
education predicted income as well as men’s education does?  
Earlier studies on the topic have focused either on earnings inequality (e.g. Breen & 
Salazar, 2011) or on income inequality (e.g. Breen & Andersen, 2012) between 
households. The chain connecting educational homogamy to income inequality might be 
longer than for earnings inequality. However, there are substantive reasons why 
educational homogamy might be at least equally important for income inequality. On the 
one hand, lower educated individuals might be more likely to receive non-labor income 
because they are more likely to be out of work or to qualify for benefits from means-
tested programs. On the other hand, if non-labor income received through benefits is 
related to previous earnings, educated persons will receive more transfers in the case of 
unemployment. In addition, non-labor income received from investments is likely to be 
far greater among educated individuals. The extent to which educational homogamy 
affects the distribution of non-labor income across households will therefore depend on 
how important various forms of transfers and other forms of non-labor income are in each 
country. Looking at earnings inequality instead of income inequality might thus either 
lead to an underestimation or overestimation of the overall impact of changes in 
educational homogamy on inequality. In our study, we found that looking at earnings 
inequality underestimates the overall possible impact on inequality. We therefore present 
the analysis based on income inequality in our main analysis, and document results for 
earnings inequality in additional analysis.  
 
Data and Measures 
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We used data from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS)
 3
 for 20 European countries 
and the United States. The LIS data are harmonized representative cross-sectional 
surveys that have been used in many key studies on income inequality (Milanovic, 2002; 
Solt, 2016). Countries differ in the time period covered by the data ranging from at least a 
decade (2000-2010 in Estonia) to 42 years (1974-2016 in the United States). To render 
the estimates of different countries more comparable, we included datasets for all years 
available that employed a similar operationalization of household income and education.    
To minimize the share of respondents still in education, we selected households where 
the head of household was between 30 and 64 years old.
4 
We excluded same-sex couples 
(as part of our analysis was based on the relationship between men’s and women’s 
education within couples) as well as households with members who were not 
(natural/step/foster/adopted) children or partners of the head of household (as dynamics at 
play in such households could be very different and go beyond the scope of this paper). 
We took both married and cohabiting partners into account. Table 1 displays the first and 
last dataset used for each country, as well as the sample sizes obtained after our 
restriction criteria were applied (See Online Appendix B for the share of cases excluded 
due to each criterion). The median sample size for each country-year was 5,826 
households and ranged from 1,078 for Luxembourg 1994 to 130,571 for Norway 2013. 
Household sample weights were included in all analysis.  
We looked at inequality in disposable household income and replicated results for 
household labor income in additional analysis. Household income was equivalized using 
the square root of the number of household members and Purchasing Power Parity 
deflators were used to adjust income variables to 2011 levels expressed in US dollars.
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We cross-checked our estimates of inequality in disposable household income (after 
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applying our sample restrictions) with those reported by Solt (2016) and found a 
correlation of 0.97 between them.
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The second key variable of the analysis was education which LIS harmonized into three 
categories: lower secondary or less (ISCED 1-2), upper secondary (ISCED 3-4) and 
tertiary education (ISCED 5-6). It could be that with this classification we missed 
important divisions based on education within specific countries, and therewith 
underestimate the contribution of educational homogamy. However, additional analysis 
based on more detailed categories of education provided very similar results (see section 
robustness checks). Cases with missing information on education were dropped from the 




We commenced our analysis by giving indications of how the relationship between 
partners’ levels of education changed over time. The association between partners’ 
educational levels was estimated using Kendall’s Tau-b, a measure that can be used to 
estimate associations between ordinal variables. We subsequently estimated whether 
changes in educational homogamy contributed to changes in income inequality over time. 
To this end we classified households into different groups based on the education of the 
male and female partner within the couple. We also incorporated men and women who 
were single and assigned the value ‘absent’ to their partner’s level of education. Both his 
and her education could therefore take on 4 values (ISCED 1-2; ISCED 3-4; ISCED 5-6; 
absent). Combining his and her education for each household led to 16 categories of 
households. We subsequently divided all cells into two groups based on the age of the 
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male partner (or the age of the female if single; set at being 47 or younger, or 48 and 
older), leading to 32 groups of households in total.
8
 
Following the studies that set the standard (Breen and Salazar, 2010; 2011; Breen and 
Andersen, 2012) we subsequently expressed inequality T using the Theil-index,
7
 and 
specifically in the following form (Breen and Andersen, 2012): 
𝑇 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
 𝑙𝑛𝑗  (
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
) + ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑗
?̅?𝑗
∑ ?̅?𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
 𝑇𝑗    [1] 
Inequality in this form depends on three quantities: 𝑝𝑗 which is the share of households in 
each of the 32 categories defined above (indexed by j); ?̅?𝑗 which is the average household 












].    [2] 
Here 𝑛𝑗  is the number of cases in group j and 𝑥𝑖|𝑗 the income of household i in group j. 
The first part of equation [1], ∑ 𝑝𝑗
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
 𝑙𝑛𝑗  (
𝑥𝑗
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗
), is the part of household income 
inequality that is due to variation between groups of households (‘between-group 
inequality’) whereas the second part expresses variation within groups of households 
(‘within-group inequality’). Our main goal was to determine the impact that changes in 
assortative mating had on changes in income inequality between two points in time (t1 
and t2). By calculating 𝑝𝑗, ?̅?𝑗, and 𝑇𝑗 for each country and time period studied, 
‘counterfactual’ analysis can be performed where one or more of these statistics takes on 
the values of another time period, while keeping the other statistics constant.  
By varying the statistic that is set at its t1 values, the contribution of the change in each of 
the three quantities to income inequality in t2 can be estimated. The counterfactual 
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scenario where one would set 𝑝𝑗 at the level of t1 but keeps ?̅?𝑗 and 𝑇𝑗 at t2 levels estimates 
the influence of changes in the distribution of households across the 32 education/family 
structure categories. This scenario simulates changes in patterns of educational 
assortative mating, but these include changes in the likelihood to remain single and 
changes in average levels of education over time too. Earlier studies have reported results 
of these simulations (e.g. Breen & Andersen, 2012). However, given that we are 
interested in the effect of the association between partners’ educations per se, we would 
ideally isolate the effect of changes in the association between partners’ educations from 
changes in levels of educational attainment and the likelihood of partnering. We therefore 
followed Breen and Salazar further (2010; 2011) in their method based on the Deming-
Stephan algorithm, where we adjusted the t1 distribution 𝑝𝑗 of households across 
categories to match the t2 marginal distributions of women’s and men’s education, as well 
as the t2 distribution of single households. In this manner, we obtained a 𝑝𝑗 that, once 
plugged into its t2 context (i.e. t2 levels of ?̅?𝑗 and 𝑇𝑗), indicated the contribution of 




Simulations of the impact of extreme changes in educational homogamy 
To test whether extreme hypothetical changes in educational homogamy could lead to 
changes in income inequality, we estimated inequality under three ‘counterfactual 
scenarios’: no association between partners’ educations (see, for instance, Eika et al., 
2014; Harmenberg, 2014), maximum homogamy given the marginal distributions of 
education in that given period (as applied by Breen and Salazar (2011) to the 2004 US 
distribution), and  maximum hyper- and hypogamy (a counterfactual situation not 
considered in the literature so far).  
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To calculate the distribution of households for the situation where partners’ educations 
would be independent, we first created 3x3 tables crossing her and his education (one-
person households were kept at original frequencies) for each age group (47- and 48+). 
We subsequently calculated the share of coupled men and women with a given level of 
education, and multiplied for each cell of the 3x3 table the corresponding shares of men’s 
and women’s education. Plugging the resulting distribution of households into equation 
[1] gave estimates of how high income inequality would have been if couples in a given 
period and time would have formed at random.  
To calculate the distribution of households where the association between educations is 
maximized (but keeping the marginal distributions of education in the population 
constant) we, again, first calculated the age-specific column and row totals for the 3x3 
tables that cross her and his education in each period and country. Second, for each cell 
on the diagonal of the table (i.e. homogamous couples) we assigned the lowest value 
between the corresponding row or column totals. Subsequently, there was only one 
possible way to complete the table, and assigned frequencies to the other cells (Breen and 
Salazar, 2011).  
To maximize hyper- and hypogamy the same strategy was followed as outlined above for 
‘maximum’ homogamy. But, rather than maximizing the share of couples falling on the 
diagonal of the table that covers only homogamous couples, the share of couples falling 
on the opposite main diagonal covering higher educated individuals partnered with lower 
educated individuals was maximized.  
Finally, we tested the hypothesis whether homogamy would be more influential if 
women’s education would predict individual income as well as men’s education does. To 
estimate the influence of educational homogamy in such a scenario, we randomly 
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assigned the individual incomes of men with a given level of education to women with 
the same level of education (within the same age group, country and year). To illustrate, 
for each higher educated woman we randomly selected a higher educated man, and 
assigned his individual income to her. To allow for the different sizes of the groups of 
higher educated men and women, men could be selected more than once. This procedure 
created an income distribution for women that resembled that of men.  Subsequently, 
household levels of income were calculated by summing men’s observed income to 
woman’s simulated income for each (observed) household. This created new average 
levels of income  ?̅?𝑗 for each household type, as well as new inequalities in income within 
household types 𝑇𝑗. These new values were used to calculate changes in inequality when 
moving from scenarios of observed homogamy to no homogamy, maximum homogamy, 
and maximum hypergamy/hypogamy. The results from this exercise indicated whether 
extreme changes in educational homogamy would affect income inequality between 
households in a world where women’s education is as predictive of individual income as 
men’s education is.  
An illustrative example: Spain in 2013 
We illustrate the simulations performed for each country and period by using a stylized 
example based on the data for Spain in 2013. Table 2a displays the actual distribution of 
couples according to her and his education. In the first simulation, we maintained the 
marginal educational distributions of the last period (2013 in Spain), but applied the 
pattern of assortative mating observed in the first period (1990 in Spain). The procedure 
used to arrive at such a distribution is based on an iterative process where the frequencies 
in each cell observed in 1990 are adjusted to fit the column and row totals of 2013 (see 
Breen and Salazar, 2010). In this manner, the relative proportions across cells are 
maintained, which is the case when comparing the resulting distribution displayed in 
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Table 2b (boldfaced numbers indicate groups that increase in size, and numbers in italics 




Our second counterfactual situation consisted of simulating a situation where no 
homogamy exists. Table 2c displays the result of this exercise for Spain 2013. The 
percentage displayed in each cell is obtained by multiplying the corresponding row total 
with the column total (expressed as proportions of 1) of Table 2a. This is the distribution 
one would expect if education would play no role in the partnering process and 
individuals would match randomly across the educational groups. As observed, the 
percentage of homogamous couples is lower in this simulation compared to the actual 
situation of Table 2a (i.e. the ‘homogamy’ diagonal is in italics). 
To simulate maximum homogamy, the proportions of couples falling on the main 
diagonal of the table covering homogamous couples are maximized. For each cell on this 
main diagonal, the lowest value found among the corresponding column and row totals of 
Table 2a is taken (i.e. each percentage of the diagonal either corresponds to the row or 
column total). Subsequently, the percentages in the other cells can only take on one 
possible value to maintain all row and column totals of Table 2a (i.e. the rest of the table 
is completed by maximizing the shares on the diagonals below and above the main one, 
followed by the cells in the upper and lower corner). Finally, the simulation of maximum 
hyper- and hypogamy is identical to that of maximum homogamy, but the opposite main 





We started by describing changes over time in income inequality as well as the 
association between partners’ educations across the 21 countries in Figures 1a-1c. The 
figures show levels of inequality in disposable household income on the left y-axis and 
levels of homogamy on the right y-axis.  
As by now well known, the general trend in terms of income inequality has been upward 
over the last decades. At the same time, there are a few exceptions to this trend, all in 
countries with high initial levels of income inequality. Ireland showed the largest 
reduction in income inequality of 33% between 1994 and 2010. The trends in homogamy 
revealed, somewhat unexpectedly, that associations between women’s and men’s levels 
of education within couples have in general declined. The clearest examples in this regard 
were Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia. There were a couple of deviations from this 
overall trend, most notably France, Ireland and Luxembourg. The extent to which 
changes in educational homogamy were observed did not appear directly related to the 
time period covered. Even though many countries with long time-series experienced 
declining homogamy in earlier periods, there are also countries with recent declines in 
homogamy (e.g. Finland and Spain) and countries with long time-series that show 
increases in homogamy (e.g. France and Luxembourg).  
Given that educational homogamy is predicted to positively affect income inequality, the 
observed declines in educational homogamy might have dampened the observed 
increases in income inequality. Was this indeed the case? The cranberry-colored dashed 
lines in Figure 1 display the results of the counterfactual exercises looking at the 
influence of changes in patterns of assortative mating on inequality. The cranberry lines 
are hardly discernable from the solid black lines that indicate actual observed inequality. 
This means that inequality trends would have been practically identical if educational 




Table 3 gives the precise numbers of how high inequality was estimated to have been if 
homogamy would not have changed over time as well as the percentage difference 
between actual and simulated inequality (for the last year considered). Across countries, 
inequality was estimated to be 0.3% higher at the median if homogamy would not have 
changed over time. This suggests that changes in educational homogamy have indeed 
dampened increases in inequality to a small extent. In most countries this equalizing 
effect was very small, but it was slightly bigger in France and the Netherlands where 
income inequality was simulated to be 3.2 and 5.1 per cent higher, respectively, if 
homogamy would have remained equal across time. In some countries homogamy 
appeared to have contributed slightly to inequality, most notably in Denmark and 
Luxembourg where simulated inequality was estimated to be 1.0% and 1.4% lower 
respectively. To put the simulated differences in inequality into context, Table 3 displays 
the actual observed changes in inequality across the observation windows considered; 
across countries inequality increased by a median 26%. In general the conclusion drawn 
in earlier studies therefore holds that changes in educational homogamy are unlikely to 
have contributed in a major way to changes in income inequality; in France and the 
Netherlands a small influence of changes in educational homogamy was found.  
-TABLE 3- 
 
Would extreme changes in educational homogamy affect income inequality? 
A major hypothesis proposed in earlier studies is that changes in educational homogamy 
have been too small to have had important effects on income inequality. We tested 
whether this was the case by considering various hypothetical extreme changes in 
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homogamy. In the first of these simulations we considered a scenario where hypogamy 
and hypergamy were maximized. These results are displayed in the column ‘Simulation 
2’ of Table 4. Inequality was simulated to be lower compared to observed levels of 
inequality with a median of 11% across countries. The second simulation we performed 
estimated inequality in the situation where the educations of partners’ were independent 
(Simulation 3 in Table 4). Again, simulated inequality was lower in all cases, but the 
changes were smaller with a median of 5% lower inequality. Finally, homogamy was 
maximized for Simulation 4 of Table 4. In this situation inequality was simulated to be 
higher in almost all cases, with a median of 3% higher inequality across countries.  
-TABLE 4- 
The results of the simulations hence followed a logical pattern where inequality was 
estimated to be lowest if people would partner across educational groups and highest if 
partnering would occur within educational groups. In several countries, inequality 
changed considerably depending on the scenario considered. The column ‘Change 2-4’ of 
Table 4 indicates for each country how much inequality would change when moving 
from maximum hyper- and hypogamy to maximum homogamy. Given the logical 
ordering of the different scenarios, these numbers indicate the maximum impact changes 
in homogamy could have in each country (given marginal educational distributions in 
place). In some cases the maximum impact of extreme changes in homogamy was still 
quite modest, such as Norway and the UK where the most extreme changes in assortative 
mating would still only lead to a change in inequality of around 7%. In both countries, 
homogamy declined across the period studied, and the limited potential influence of 
homogamy explains why these changes in educational homogamy where estimated to 
have had little impact on inequality. This argument also appeared applicable to countries 
such as Finland, Germany, Italy, and the United States. 
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Inequality was estimated to be much more sensitive to extreme simulated changes in 
homogamy in other cases, most notably France and Poland where inequality was 
estimated to be 30% higher in the scenario of maximum homogamy as compared to the 
scenario of maximum hyper- and hypogamy. In Greece this percentage was even as high 
as 41%. All countries where actual changes in educational homogamy were estimated to 
have had an impact on inequality that was greater than 1% (i.e. ‘Change 1’ in Table 3) 
had an estimated potential impact of extreme changes in homogamy on or above the 
cross-country median of 18%. The  potential impact of extreme changes in educational 
homogamy can be considered as relatively large as they come close to the actual changes 
in income inequality observed over the period considered (median of 25.5%), which have 
provoked considerable public and academic concern. It has to be emphasized, however, 
that such large impacts on inequality would require a reversal of the correlation between 
partners’ education from negative to positive (or the other way around).   
 
Cross-national variation and the predictive power of women’s education 
The conclusion whether changes in homogamy have been too small to affect inequality 
depends on the context considered. In some countries even the most extreme changes in 
homogamy would still have a relatively small impact on inequality, but in other countries 
the possible impact is more considerable. How can cross-country variation be explained? 
As a first step, we made sure whether the cross-national variation in the possible impact 
of homogamy is due to the extent to which educational homogamy creates a correlation 
between partners’ incomes (following Breen & Salazar, 2011), which is the hypothesized 
mechanism through which educational homogamy should matter for inequality between 
households. This analysis, displayed in Online Appendix C, confirmed that the 
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correlation between partners’ incomes due to educational assortative mating was highly 
correlated with the maximum possible impact of educational homogamy on inequality 
(correlation = 0.68).   
Previous research has suggested that the influence of educational homogamy on the 
correlation between partners’ incomes is determined by the relationship between 
women’s education and their earnings (Schwartz, 2013). To verify this possibility we ran 
the same set of simulations run so far, but this time for a hypothetical universe where 
women’s education would predict their individual income as well as men’s education 
predicted men’s individual income. Online Appendix D displays the complete results and 
Figure 2 summarizes them. The x-axis indicates how much simulated extreme changes in 
homogamy (i.e. when moving from maximum hypergamy/hypogamy to maximum 
homogamy) would contribute to inequality in a hypothetical universe where women 
generated income like men. These are compared to equivalent results based on actual 
levels of personal income on the y-axis. In all cases, the influence of extreme changes in 
homogamy is simulated to be smaller in a fictive universe where women’s education 
would predict their individual income as well as men’s education.  
-FIGURE 2- 
These results contradict the expectations formed beforehand that it is the weak 
association between women’s education and their income that limits the influence of 
educational homogamy. How could this pattern be explained? In the literature review of 
this article, we posited that factors that determine the importance of women’s income for 
educational homogamy’s impact on inequality are the share of women who are employed, 
but also which women participate in the labor market. Figure 3 shows the relationship 
between levels of female labor force participation and the possible maximum influence of 
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educational homogamy on inequality (i.e. the numbers of Column ‘Change 2-4 of Table 
4). Contrary to expectation but in line with the surprising results presented before, the 
correlation between the share of women employed and the maximum potential influence 
of homogamy is strong and negative: -0.60. Intuitively, one might expect educational 
homogamy to matter more as women’s employment is higher and their contribution to 
household income becomes more similar to that of men. But, this might not be the case if 
especially lower educated women start working more as female labor force participation 
rises. In line with this argument, Figure 4 shows how the negative association of being a 
lower educated woman with personal income is lower in contexts where female labor 
force participation is higher (correlation 0.61 between both country-level indicators).
11
 It 
is likely that in the settings studied here female labor force participation among educated 
women is high across all countries, but, only when female labor force participation 
reaches universality lower educated women start to be employed in high numbers too.  
The association of being a lower educated woman with personal income was related to 
the overall influence of educational homogamy on inequality (correlation between both is 
-0.29 but -0.71 when excluding four outliers: Czech Republic; Greece; Poland; France). 
But, contrary to expectation this correlation was weaker in settings where many women 
participated in the labor market.  
-FIGURES 3 & 4- 
Robustness Checks 
We ran various robustness checks by replicating the main results of Tables 3 and 4. All of 
these additional results are reported in Online Appendix E. Firstly, we used equivalized 
household gross earnings instead of disposable household income. The influence of 
educational homogamy was smaller in practically all countries as compared to using 
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disposable household income. At the same time, the ranking of countries remained very 
similar. Secondly, we kept all cases with missing information on education in the analysis 
and considered them as separate educational categories. Results for Belgium, Greece, and 
Sweden were different and appeared unreliable once including missing cases due to very 
small cell sizes for categories of households where one partner had missing information 
on education; for all other countries results were practically identical. Thirdly, we 
excluded singles from the analysis to consider inequality between households headed by 
couples only. The ranking of countries was practically identical, but the impact of 
extreme changes in homogamy on inequality was estimated to be bigger. Fourthly, using 
three instead of two age groups in the simulations did not change results. Fifthly, using 
five instead of three educational groups produced similar results too, and interestingly the 





Despite concerns that changes in homogamy within couples might have contributed to 
increased income inequality (Breen and Salazar, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 2007; 
Schwartz, 2013; Western et al., 2008), most previous studies on the topic concluded that 
changes in educational homogamy have had little impact on income inequality (Breen 
and Salazar, 2010; 2011; Breen and Andersen, 2012; Eika et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 
2014; Hryshko et al., 2015). In this article, we extended this finding to a wide set of 
European countries, with a couple of partial exceptions. Across countries, changes in 
educational homogamy in fact appeared related to a small to negligible decrease in 
income inequality, as educational homogamy seems to have declined over time in most 
countries. In a quest to explain these results, we found that even extreme changes in 
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educational homogamy would have a relatively small impact on inequality in some 
countries, whereas its possible influence appeared considerable in others. A limited 
possible influence of educational homogamy was observed especially in countries with 
high levels of female labor force participation. In such countries women’s education was 
less strongly related to their individual income. 
A major conclusion that can be drawn is that concerns about large inequality amplifying 
effects of changes in educational homogamy appear mostly unwarranted; first of all 
because educational homogamy appears to have weakened over time in most countries. 
Changes in educational homogamy therefore reduced income inequality between 
households to a small extent in some cases. Recent studies had already hinted at 
decreasing levels of homogamy (De Hauw et al., 2017), primarily due to women 
becoming increasingly more likely to ‘marry down’ (see also Esteve et al., 2012; 2016). 
In simulations where hypogamy (i.e. the share of women ‘marrying down’) was 
maximized, income inequality between households was estimated to be the lowest of all 
observed and simulated scenarios. If ‘marrying down’ becomes ever more common, this 
might imply that future changes in assortative mating can be expected to reduce 
inequality between households. How strong such equalizing effects are will likely depend 
on the context studied.  
A second major conclusion of this paper is that educational homogamy can have its 
strongest influence on inequality in contexts where female labor force participation is 
relatively low. When female labor force participation comes closer to universality the 
association between women’s education and women’s income appeared to be weaker. It 
is likely that it is only once higher educated women’s labor force participation reaches a 
ceiling that lower educated women start catching up in terms of their participation rates 
and their individual income. Based on these claims, it can be expected that changes in 
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educational homogamy are likely to have an ever smaller impact on inequality in the 
future if female labor force participation converges to high levels across countries.  
Changes in educational homogamy might thus have more impact on inequality in more 
traditional settings. The time periods covered for each country in this study differed, and 
the estimated potential influence of hypothetical extreme changes in homogamy might be 
smaller if more recent data would be used for two countries that had no recent data 
available in the LIS (i.e. Belgium and Sweden).  However, studying more traditional 
contexts, either from the past or from other countries could be a fruitful avenue for future 
research to test the claims made here that high levels of female labor force participation 
limit the possible impact of educational homogamy on inequality.  
Our results documenting a mostly limited influence of actual changes in educational 
homogamy on inequality are in line with previous research. A handful of previous studies 
had also looked at the influence of extreme hypothetical changes in homogamy on 
inequality for the United States and Norway (Breen & Salazar, 2011; Eika et al., 2014; 
Harmenberg, 2014). These studies provided inconsistent results regarding the United 
States, with a negligible influence found in a study on earnings inequality (Breen & 
Salazar, 2011) and a small influence encountered in estimates for income inequality (Eika 
et al., 2014; Harmenberg, 2014). We also found a larger possible impact of educational 
homogamy in the case of income inequality as compared to earnings inequality (See 
Online Appendix E). However, in both cases we found generally larger effects of extreme 
hypothetical changes in homogamy as compared to earlier studies (11% and 15% 
maximum changes in inequality, respectively, in the United States). This difference is 
likely to have arisen because earlier studies did not consider the scenario of maximum 
hyper- and hypogamy. Inequality was estimated to be lowest in this last scenario as 
compared to all other observed and simulated levels of inequality.  
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There are some limitations of this study. Our cross-national and cross-temporal approach 
led us to use a rather crude measure of education.
 
It could be that in some countries we 
missed important divisions between educational groups due to this limitation. Robustness 
checks using more detailed categories of education yielded very similar results. In general 
matching on education therefore appears not to be the most relevant characteristic for 
income inequality. Earlier research on income inequality in general has also concluded 
that inequality within groups, defined by their family structure and education, has been 
largely responsible for increases in household income inequality over time (Western et 
al., 2008). Future research is therefore likely to find more action when focusing on other 
factors, besides education, that could account for the increasing association in income 
between partners (Schwartz, 2013; but see Grotti & Scherer, 2016 and Nieuwenhuis et 
al., 2017). A high association between partners’ incomes can be the result of a variety of 
processes, of which partner selection on education is only one. One process is the 
matching of partners based on their income generation potential (Frémeaux and Lefranc, 
2015). A recent paper on the US, however, found no role for partner selection based on 
earnings once explaining changes in income inequality. Processes that take place after 
union formation, such as the division of labor, appeared more important (Gonalons-Pons 
and Schwartz, 2017). Future research could investigate whether this conclusion also holds 
in other contexts.  
The cross-national approach of our paper also prevented us from zooming in on 
individual countries. In general the story held that changes in educational homogamy led 
to an estimated change in inequality above 1% only in countries with both considerable 
changes in educational homogamy and a large potential impact of educational homogamy 
on inequality. However, in France and Ireland increases in educational homogamy were 
estimated to have slightly reduced levels of inequality. It could be that specific patterns of 
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educational assortative mating which were not captured by a simple association between 
partners’ educations have contributed to these results. Future country-specific studies are 
needed to study this further.  
There is another important limitation of this study. The counterfactual simulations 
performed in the paper rely on several assumptions that might not be realistic. In the 
simulations, we assumed that as the relative proportions of households falling into a 
given group changes, the average household income of these groups remains equal (as 
well as its within-group variation). If there are systematic ways in which groups differ on 
unobserved characteristics that affect income, this assumption might not hold.  
To what extent would this affect conclusions? In general, we cannot claim that our results 
would not change if such unobserved factors would be accounted for. However, it could 
be expected that if non-homogamous couples differ systematically from homogamous 
couples on unobserved traits affecting income, that those non-homogamous couples are 
the more disadvantaged group (net of education). In non-homogamous couples at least 
one partner ‘married down’ in terms of education. This could reflect, on average, 
unobserved socioeconomic disadvantages if one assumes that having a higher educated 
partner is generally more desirable (or, instead, that having a homogamous partner is 
what people generally look for). If this is the case, our simulations would over-estimate 
the possible influence of changes in educational homogamy on income inequality (as 
moving individuals from non-homogamous couples to homogamous categories would 
reduce average income in the homogamy categories). The influence of educational 




In conclusion, we found no strong support for the hypothesis that changes in partner 
selection based on education, an important socioeconomic marker, played an important 
role in creating inequality between households. Our analysis found that educational 
homogamy has the potential to impact inequality in settings with relatively low levels of 
female labor force participation. Given the generally increasing levels of female labor 
force participation, the potential impact of educational homogamy is therefore expected 
to decline further in the future.  
Notes.  
1 
We use the terms homogamy and assortative mating interchangeably for the extent to 
which individuals with given characteristics form unions together. 
2 
Greenwood and others (2014) initially reported a considerable influence of educational 
homogamy on inequality, but later had to rectify their results. 
http://www.cemfi.es/~guner/ggks_corrigendum.pdf 
3 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database, http://www.lisdatacenter.org (multiple 
countries; accessed 11/10/16 – 30/05/18). Luxembourg: LIS. 
4 
In line with Breen and Salazar (2011) we exclude cases where the partner was younger 
than 18 years and couples where the male was 30 years older than his partner, or the 





See Online Appendix A. Based on this check we decided to exclude Luxembourg 




There are several other inequality measures available such as the Gini index, but we 
used the Theil index due to its decomposable features needed for the analysis performed 
here. A limitation of the Theil is that it does not allow for negative or zero values, we 
therefore bottom truncated all levels of income at 1.  
8 
We divided the sample by age to account for age-differences in household income, and 
to put restrictions on who is expected to partner with whom in later analysis. The choice 
for two age groups is arbitrary and driven by the nature of the analysis which does not 




See the appendix to Breen and Salazar (2010) for more details. This method relies on 
maintaining the relative cell sizes between certain key categories of households at t1 
levels, while adjusting row and column totals of the 5x5 table to t2 levels through an 
iterative process.  
10 
When running a poisson regression on the frequencies in each cell, using her and his 
education and their interaction as independent variables, the interaction effects display 
identical coefficients for both the distributions in Table 2b and Table 2e 
11 
The association between having lower education and being employed also declines as 
women’s employment increases (correlation 0.51, not shown). 
12 
Given that datasets are harmonized using three categories of education, using five 
categories of education made datasets within countries incomparable too. We therefore 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Datasets used and final sample sizes  
Country Year n Country Year N 
Austria 1987 5839 Italy 2014 3979 
Austria 2010 3914 Luxembourg 1994 1078 
Belgium 1985 4018 Luxembourg 2013 2677 
Belgium 1997 2688 Netherlands 1983 2827 
Czech Republic 1992 9924 Netherlands 2013 6903 
Czech Republic 2013 4431 Norway 1986 2843 
Denmark 1987 5812 Norway 2013 130571 
Denmark 2013 48230 Poland 1986 7553 
Estonia 2000 3557 Poland 2013 21289 
Estonia 2010 2580 Slovakia 1992 9781 
Finland 1995 6460 Slovakia 2010 3158 
Finland 2013 7224 Slovenia 1997 1545 
France 1978 6422 Slovenia 2010 2419 
France 2010 6522 Spain 1990 11922 
Germany 1994 4067 Spain 2013 6743 
Germany 2013 9152 Sweden 1992 8355 
Greece 1995 2535 Sweden 2005 9769 
Greece 2010 2931 United Kingdom 1999 14825 
Ireland 1994 1925 United Kingdom 2013 11771 
Ireland 2010 2466 United States 1974 6234 
Italy 1989 5369 United States 2016 39674 




Tables 2a-2e. Actual and simulated distributions of households for Spain 2013 




















Note. Distributions for households with heads aged 47 or less. Bold numbers indicate household shares that 
increased in simulations and italics indicate declines as compared to observed shares.  
  
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 19.9% 9.1% 9.9% 39.0% 
Middle 5.0% 7.2% 10.4% 22.7% 
High 4.7% 4.8% 28.8% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 24.3% 7.0% 7.7% 39.0% 
Middle 3.5% 8.6% 10.6% 22.7% 
High 1.9% 5.6% 30.8% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 11.6% 8.3% 19.1% 39.0% 
Middle 6.7% 4.8% 11.1% 22.7% 
High 11.4% 8.1% 18.8% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 29.7% 0.0% 9.3% 39.0% 
Middle 0.0% 21.2% 1.5% 22.7% 
High 0.0% 0.0% 38.4% 38.4% 
Column Total 29.7% 21.2% 49.1% 100% 
 Her education  
His education Low Middle High Row Total 
Low 59.8% 4.2% 1.7% 65.6% 
Middle 8.2% 5.0% 2.2% 15.4% 
High 6.1% 4.4% 8.4% 19.0% 
Column Total 74.1% 13.7% 12.3% 100% 
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Note. Simul.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change 1: Percentage change between observed and simulated Theil;  
Change 2: Percentage change in inequality over period considered (Theil last year – Theil first year)/Theil first year.  
   Simulation Result  Inequality Trend 
Country Year Theil Simul. 1 Change 1  Year Theil Change 2 
Austria 2010 0.150 0.153 1.9%  1987 0.084 79.4% 
Belgium 1997 0.104 0.105 0.9%  1985 0.091 13.8% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.144 0.145 0.3%  1992 0.081 77.1% 
Denmark 2013 0.116 0.115 -1.0%  1987 0.107 8.2% 
Estonia 2013 0.205 0.205 0.0%  2000 0.266 -22.9% 
Finland 2013 0.124 0.125 0.4%  1995 0.094 32.6% 
France 2010 0.177 0.183 3.2%  1978 0.195 -9.0% 
Germany 2013 0.192 0.192 0.3%  1994 0.137 40.7% 
Greece 2010 0.193 0.193 0.1%  1995 0.223 -13.3% 
Ireland 2010 0.167 0.170 1.9%  1994 0.248 -32.7% 
Italy 2014 0.208 0.210 0.7%  1989 0.166 25.5% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.150 0.148 -1.4%  1994 0.106 41.5% 
Netherlands 2013 0.132 0.139 5.1%  1983 0.113 16.8% 
Norway 2013 0.121 0.121 0.2%  1986 0.084 43.4% 
Poland 2013 0.234 0.232 -0.7%  1986 0.118 98.6% 
Slovakia 2010 0.132 0.131 -0.8%  1992 0.074 77.7% 
Slovenia 2010 0.125 0.125 0.2%  1997 0.097 29.4% 
Spain 2013 0.222 0.226 1.5%  1990 0.187 18.9% 
Sweden 2005 0.097 0.097 -0.1%  1992 0.083 16.9% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.228 0.229 0.3%  1999 0.271 -15.7% 
United States 2016 0.287 0.288 0.3%  1974 0.174 64.9% 
Median      0.3%    25.5% 
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Note. Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: 
Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4;  
Country Year Theil Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.150 0.131 0.143 0.154 17.9% 
Belgium 1997 0.104 0.086 0.097 0.104 22.0% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.144 0.121 0.135 0.152 25.6% 
Denmark 2013 0.116 0.105 0.113 0.117 11.4% 
Estonia 2013 0.205 0.188 0.198 0.210 11.6% 
Finland 2013 0.124 0.116 0.121 0.132 14.4% 
France 2010 0.177 0.135 0.169 0.176 30.3% 
Germany 2013 0.192 0.173 0.185 0.198 14.3% 
Greece 2010 0.193 0.138 0.173 0.195 41.2% 
Ireland 2010 0.167 0.140 0.161 0.166 18.5% 
Italy 2014 0.208 0.187 0.200 0.215 15.0% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.150 0.130 0.138 0.157 21.3% 
Netherlands 2013 0.132 0.118 0.126 0.145 23.0% 
Norway 2013 0.121 0.114 0.119 0.123 7.4% 
Poland 2013 0.234 0.168 0.223 0.225 34.2% 
Slovakia 2010 0.132 0.117 0.125 0.137 16.9% 
Slovenia 2010 0.125 0.103 0.117 0.129 24.9% 
Spain 2013 0.222 0.198 0.212 0.233 18.1% 
Sweden 2005 0.097 0.089 0.094 0.101 13.2% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.228 0.214 0.225 0.228 6.8% 
United States 2016 0.287 0.258 0.277 0.296 14.6% 
Median      17.9% 
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Note. Inequality: Observed inequality in disposable household income; Counterfactual: Simulated 




Figure 2. Possible influence of homogamy on inequality if women’s education predicted 
personal income as well as men’s education does  
Note. X-axis are results of simulations where women’s income is replaced by a randomly selected level of 
personal income of an equally educated man. Household income was the sum of partners’ personal 
incomes, divided by the square root of household members. Y-axis results are equivalent to results from 
Table 4, but based on summing personal income instead of disposable household income in order to make 
results comparable to those of the x-axis (detailed results in Tables D1 & D2 of the online appendix). Both 
indicate the percentage change in inequality when moving from maximum hyper/hypogamy to maximum 




Figure 3. Association between female employment and potential influence of 
homogamy on inequality 
 
Note. Scatterplot of share of women employed and results of column “Change 2-4” from Table 4.   
Figure 4. Association between female employment and correlation between women’s 
lower education and women’s income 
 
Note. Scatterplot of share of women employed and correlation between women having ISCED 1-2 
education and women’s personal income 
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Online Appendix A. Scatterplot of Gini coefficients of disposable household income 
inequality based on final samples as compared to Solt (2016) 
 
Gini coefficients calculated based on disposable household income for the final samples 
used in the analysis of this study (Study Sample). These are compared with equivalent 
statistic reported by Solt (2016). The three outliers Luxembourg 1991, Slovenia 2012, 
Slovakia 2013  were dropped from the analysis based on this cross-verification of 




Online Appendix B. Cases dropped per country  
Table B1. Percentage of cases excluded due to missing data or exclusion criterion 









Austria 1987 43.1 0 7.9 0 0.05 0 5839 
Austria 2010 32.8 0 5.5 0.3 0 0 3914 
Belgium 1985 33.8 0 3.5 0.1 0 2.8 4018 
Belgium 1997 34.3 0 3.6 0.03 0.1 8.9 2688 
Czech Republic 1992 32.6 0 9.2 0.01 0.05 0.006 9924 
Czech Republic 2013 39.8 0 8.5 0.02 0.05 0 4431 
Denmark 1987 44.2 0 0.5 0 0 16 5812 
Denmark 2013 39.6 0 4.9 0.2 0.02 4 48230 
Estonia 2000 29.9 0 16.3 0 0 0.03 3557 
Estonia 2010 29.9 0 15.5 0 0.03 1.4 2580 
Finland 1995 26.5 0 5.1 0.01 0.05 0 6460 
Finland 2013 32.3 0 2.9 0.3 0.03 0 7224 
France 1978 30.9 1.6 9 1.2 0.04 0.9 6422 
France 2010 31.7 0 3.2 0.5 0.01 0.09 6522 
Germany 1994 33.3 0 4.5 0 0.01 6.2 4067 
Germany 2013 31.6 0 2 0.4 1 15.4 9152 
Greece 1995 35.4 1.3 18.1 0 0 0.7 2535 
Greece 2010 44.7 .1 10.5 0 0 1.9 2931 
Ireland 1994 31.6 .5 10.4 0 0 2 1925 
Ireland 2010 36.4 .4 7.6 0.6 0 2.4 2466 
Italy 1989 28.4 0 9.4 0 0.03 0 5369 
Italy 2014 45.8 .03 9.9 0.08 0 0 3979 
Luxembourg 1994 32.2 0 10.4 0 0 2.3 1078 
Luxembourg 2013 25.9 .2 5.1 0.3 0.04 1.5 2677 
Netherlands 1983 36.2 0 0 1.8 0 7 2827 
Netherlands 2013 29.4 0 1.5 0.8 0 1.9 6903 
Norway 1986 35.3 0 9.3 0.03 0.03 2.5 2843 
Norway 2013 38.3 0 4.4 0.2 0.009 5.6 130571 
Poland 1986 28.8 0 0 0 0.01 0.4 7553 
Poland 2013 32.0 0 15.8 0.03 0.04 0 21289 
Slovakia 1992 31.1 0 11.2 0.04 0 0 9781 
Slovakia 2010 28.9 .06 14.4 0 0 0.1 3158 
Slovenia 1997 24.8 0 20.3 0 0 0 1545 
Slovenia 2010 28.5 0 13.7 0 1.2 0 2419 
Spain 1990 31.9 0 17.2 0 0.008 0 11922 
Spain 2013 35.6 0 11.7 2.4 0 0.7 6743 
Sweden 1992 32.2 0 0 0 0.01 1.2 8355 
Sweden 2005 38.2 0 1.5 0.2 0.01 1.2 9769 
United Kingdom 1999 37.6 0 4.7 0.1 0 0 14825 
United Kingdom 2013 38.3 .008 3.8 0.6 0.02 1.1 11771 
United States 1974 38.3 0 11.9 0 0.04 0 6234 
United States 2016 34.4 0 12.6 0.9 0.2 0 39674 
Age: % of households dropped due to head of household’s age<30 or age>60 or age missing; Income: % 
missing household income; Household Structure: % with non-nuclear adult family members; % Same-sex 
couples; Age difference: % dropped due to partner <age 18 or due to male partner more than 30 years older 
or female partner more than 25 years older. Education missing: Percentage of cases with missing education 
information.    
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Online Appendix C. Correlation between partners’ incomes due to educational 
assortative mating 
For this additional analysis we aimed to make sure that our results regarding the 
sensitivity of levels of inequality to changes in homogamy are due to the expected 
process of educational homogamy increasing income homogamy within couples. It could 
be that idiosyncratic processes in specific countries drive our results, such as very high 
levels of within-group inequality for certain combinations of education or imprecise 
results due to small sample sizes. Educational homogamy is expected to affect inequality 
by creating a correlation between partners’ incomes. We therefore estimated the extent to 
which educational homogamy patterns in each country created a correlation between 
partners’ incomes. We followed the procedure used by Breen and Salazar for their 
analysis of the United States (2011).  
Our aim is to calculate the correlation of partners’ individual incomes due to educational 
assortative mating. We define 𝑥r as the average individual income of male partners in the 
rth educational category (where r = 1, 2, 3), 𝑥 as the average individual income of 
partnered men overall, 𝑦s as the average individual income of female partners in the sth 
educational category (where s = 1, 2, 3), and 𝑦 as the average individual income of 
partnered women overall. Q is the 3x3 cross-tabulation of his and her education, and the 
cell entries 𝑞𝑟𝑠 represent the relative frequency of each household type as a share of the 
overall partnered population. The covariance between her and his income that is due to 
educational assortative mating can in that case be expressed as ∑ ∑ (?̅?𝑟 − ?̅?)(?̅?𝑠 −𝑠𝑟
?̅?) 𝑞𝑟𝑠. Once dividing this quantity by the product of the standard deviations of partnered 
men’s incomes and partnered women’s incomes 𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑦 we obtain the absolute part of the 
correlation between his and her earnings due to educational assortative mating.  
Figure C1 displays the correlation between the results of this procedure for each country, 
i.e. the correlation in partners’ incomes due to educational assortative mating, with the 
impact on inequality of extreme homogamy changes (i.e. the estimated change in 
inequality when moving from maximum hyper- and hypogamy to maximum homogamy, 




Figure C1. Relationship between homogamy’s effect on income correlation among 
partners and its effect on inequality  
 
Correlation = 0.68 
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Online Appendix D. Analysis for hypothetical universe ‘where women’s education predicts individual income as well as men’s education’ 












Note. Sim.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change: Percentage change between observed and Sim.1 Theil; Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing 
hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change 
when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4. Results based on summing total personal incomes instead of disposable household income, hence, estimates of levels of inequality are not 
strictly comparable to Table 3, they are comparable to Table D2 on the next page. Correlation of % Change of Table D1 with % Change of Table 3 0.924; Correlation of % 
Change 2-4 of Table D1 with % Change 2-4 of Table 3 0.67. 
Country Year Theil Sim. 1 Change Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.360 0.364 1.1% 0.329 0.348 0.367 11.6% 
Belgium 1997 0.488 0.490 0.5% 0.439 0.568 0.494 12.5% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.417 0.418 0.2% 0.373 0.040 0.436 16.9% 
Denmark 2013 0.259 0.259 0.2% 0.257 0.257 0.260 1.2% 
Estonia 2010 0.504 0.504 -0.1% 0.485 0.494 0.513 5.7% 
Finland 2013 0.356 0.356 0.0% 0.351 0.354 0.360 2.6% 
France 2010 0.379 0.388 2.3% 0.347 0.374 0.381 10.1% 
Germany 2013 0.408 0.408 -0.1% 0.380 0.407 0.403 6.0% 
Greece 2010 0.361 0.361 -0.1% 0.310 0.341 0.370 19.4% 
Ireland 2010 0.454 0.456 0.4% 0.404 0.440 0.463 14.7% 
Italy 2014 0.371 0.372 0.3% 0.345 0.359 0.381 10.4% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.308 0.303 -1.6% 0.271 0.288 0.316 16.6% 
Netherlands 2013 0.316 0.326 3.1% 0.295 0.307 0.333 13.1% 
Norway 2013 0.309 0.309 0.1% 0.309 0.308 0.311 0.6% 
Poland 2013 0.333 0.333 0.0% 0.300 0.319 0.339 13.0% 
Slovakia 2010 0.376 0.374 -0.4% 0.355 0.369 0.379 6.8% 
Slovenia 2010 0.267 0.266 -0.4% 0.264 0.264 0.268 1.5% 
Spain 2013 0.441 0.443 0.5% 0.428 0.436 0.446 4.1% 
Sweden 2005 0.350 0.350 0.0% 0.335 0.346 0.352 5.0% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.472 0.473 0.1% 0.446 0.463 0.476 6.8% 
United States 2016 0.419 0.420 0.2% 0.398 0.411 0.425 6.8% 
Median    0.1%    6.8% 
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Note. Sim.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change: Percentage change between observed and Sim.1 Theil; Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing 
hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change 
when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4; 
  
Country Year Theil Sim. 1 Change Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.221 0.224 1.6% 0.187 0.211 0.223 19.4% 
Belgium 1997 0.342 0.345 0.9% 0.287 0.318 0.353 23.1% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.218 0.218 -0.2% 0.182 0.203 0.232 27.3% 
Denmark 2013 0.160 0.159 -0.9% 0.142 0.154 0.163 14.5% 
Estonia 2010 0.260 0.260 0.1% 0.241 0.252 0.266 10.5% 
Finland 2013 0.168 0.169 0.5% 0.150 0.162 0.178 18.7% 
France 2010 0.275 0.280 2.0% 0.217 0.259 0.281 29.3% 
Germany 2013 0.293 0.294 0.1% 0.260 0.280 0.306 17.4% 
Greece 2010 0.265 0.265 0.2% 0.184 0.238 0.267 45.4% 
Ireland 2010 0.303 0.307 1.5% 0.241 0.288 0.301 25.3% 
Italy 2014 0.225 0.226 0.7% 0.200 0.215 0.232 16.1% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.207 0.204 -1.8% 0.160 0.183 0.219 37.0% 
Netherlands 2013 0.213 0.223 4.9% 0.193 0.204 0.229 18.5% 
Norway 2013 0.169 0.170 0.3% 0.158 0.165 0.174 10.5% 
Poland 2013 0.263 0.263 0.0% 0.204 0.238 0.272 33.8% 
Slovakia 2010 0.178 0.176 -0.9% 0.156 0.168 0.183 17.2% 
Slovenia 2010 0.156 0.156 0.0% 0.130 0.147 0.160 22.8% 
Spain 2013 0.294 0.300 1.9% 0.253 0.278 0.311 23.1% 
Sweden 2005 0.163 0.163 -0.1% 0.156 0.150 0.169 8.6% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.279 0.280 0.3% 0.258 0.273 0.284 10.1% 
United States 2016 0.375 0.376 0.4% 0.337 0.362 0.386 14.6% 
Median    0.3%    18.7% 
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Online Appendix E. Robustness checks 














Note. Sim.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change: Percentage change between observed and Sim.1 Theil; Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing 
hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change 
when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4; Homogamy Effect on Earnings Correlation: Correlation between partners’ earnings due to educational assortative mating Correlation of 
% Change of Table E1 with % Change of Table 3 0.942; Correlation of % Change 2-4 of Table E1 with % Change 2-4 of Table 3 0.70. 
Country Year Theil Sim. 1 Change Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.388 0.393 1.3% 0.366 0.378 0.399 8.8% 
Belgium 1997 0.384 0.387 0.8% 0.323 0.361 0.400 24.0% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.312 0.311 -0.2% 0.265 0.293 0.327 23.5% 
Denmark 2013 0.346 0.346 -0.1% 0.321 0.337 0.358 11.5% 
Estonia 2010 0.358 0.358 0.1% 0.337 0.350 0.363 7.7% 
Finland 2013 0.343 0.344 0.3% 0.319 0.336 0.350 10.0% 
France 2010 0.444 0.451 1.7% 0.385 0.429 0.449 16.8% 
Germany 2013 0.373 0.373 0.1% 0.340 0.361 0.384 13.0% 
Greece 2010 0.370 0.370 0.1% 0.293 0.341 0.382 30.3% 
Ireland 2010 0.550 0.556 1.1% 0.506 0.540 0.546 7.9% 
Italy 2014 0.314 0.315 0.3% 0.291 0.304 0.325 11.7% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.353 0.349 -1.4% 0.313 0.331 0.363 16.0% 
Netherlands 2013 0.352 0.364 3.3% 0.319 0.339 0.370 15.9% 
Norway 2013 0.288 0.289 0.3% 0.274 0.282 0.297 8.7% 
Poland 2013 0.479 0.477 -0.4% 0.394 0.465 0.465 18.0% 
Slovakia 2010 0.298 0.296 -0.8% 0.270 0.287 0.303 12.4% 
Slovenia 2010 0.310 0.310 0.0% 0.300 0.302 0.317 5.7% 
Spain 2013 0.416 0.424 1.9% 0.356 0.392 0.440 23.6% 
Sweden 2005 0.317 0.318 0.0% 0.310 0.314 0.324 4.5% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.466 0.467 0.3% 0.438 0.459 0.470 7.2% 
United States 2016 0.469 0.470 0.3% 0.433 0.458 0.479 10.5% 
Median    0.3    11.7 
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Note. Sim.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change: Percentage change between observed and Sim.1 Theil; Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing 
hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change 
when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4;  
Correlation of % Change of Table E2 with % Change of Table 3 0.998; Correlation of % Change 2-4 of Table E2 with % Change 2-4 of Table 3 0.948. 
Country Year Theil Sim. 1 % Change Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 % Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.124 0.128 3.2 0.095 0.114 0.130 36.8 
Belgium 1997 0.091 0.0922 1.3 0.0666 0.0815 0.0925 38.9 
Czech Republic 2013 0.119 0.120 0.8 0.089 0.107 0.130 46.1 
Denmark 2013 0.0917 0.0901 -1.7 0.0760 0.0867 0.0931 22.5 
Estonia 2010 0.1568 0.1568 0.0 0.1349 0.1475 0.1631 20.9 
Finland 2013 0.1030 0.1037 0.7 0.0925 0.0992 0.1128 21.9 
France 2010 0.160 0.168 5.0 0.100 0.148 0.158 58.0 
Germany 2013 0.1456 0.1464 0.5 0.1160 0.1346 0.1563 34.7 
Greece 2010 0.1879 0.1880 0.1 0.1196 0.1636 0.1905 59.3 
Ireland 2010 0.1294 0.1334 3.1 0.0961 0.1226 0.1273 32.5 
Italy 2014 0.192 0.194 1.0 0.163 0.181 0.203 24.5 
Luxembourg 2013 0.1352 0.1321 -2.3 0.1036 0.1175 0.1453 40.3 
Netherlands 2013 0.1195 0.1291 8.0 0.0998 0.1112 0.1379 38.2 
Norway 2013 0.0923 0.0926 0.3 0.0851 0.0899 0.0957 12.5 
Poland 2013 0.228 0.226 -0.9 0.143 0.214 0.215 50.3 
Slovakia 2010 0.1144 0.1131 -1.1 0.0946 0.1055 0.1201 27.0 
Slovenia 2010 0.098 0.098 0.0 0.073 0.089 0.102 39.7 
Spain 2013 0.1998 0.2042 2.2 0.1668 0.1865 0.2151 29.0 
Sweden 2005 0.0775 0.0773 -0.3 0.0665 0.0736 0.0827 24.4 
United Kingdom 2013 0.2007 0.2016 0.4 0.1832 0.1972 0.2004 9.4 
United States 2016 0.237 0.238 0.4 0.200 0.226 0.248 24.0 
Median    0.4    32.5 
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Note. Sim.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change: Percentage change between observed and Sim.1 Theil; Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing 
hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change 
when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4;  
Correlation of % Change of Table E3 with % Change of Table 3 0.97; Correlation of % Change 2-4 of Table E3 with % Change 2-4 of Table 3 0.98 
Country Year Theil Sim. 1 % Change Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 % Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.150 0.152 1.3 0.131 0.143 0.154 17.7 
Belgium 1997 0.104 0.104 0.4 0.085 0.967 0.105 23.9 
Czech Republic 2013 0.144 0.144 0.1 0.121 0.135 0.151 25.4 
Denmark 2013 0.116 0.115 -1.1 0.104 0.112 0.118 12.6 
Estonia 2010 0.205 0.204 -0.4 0.189 0.197 0.209 10.6 
Finland 2013 0.125 0.125 0.6 0.114 0.121 0.132 15.9 
France 2010 0.178 0.183 3.0 0.133 0.167 0.175 31.3 
Germany 2013 0.192 0.192 0.4 0.174 0.185 0.197 13.5 
Greece 2010 0.193 0.193 0.1 0.135 0.172 0.194 43.2 
Ireland 2010 0.167 0.170 1.8 0.144 0.162 0.165 15.0 
Italy 2014 0.208 0.211 1.2 0.188 0.200 0.214 14.1 
Luxembourg 2013 0.150 0.146 -2.5 0.127 0.137 0.157 24.2 
Netherlands 2013 0.132 0.141 6.5 0.118 0.127 0.147 24.2 
Norway 2013 0.121 0.121 0.3 0.114 0.118 0.123 7.6 
Poland 2013 0.234 0.234 -0.2 0.170 0.226 0.225 32.7 
Slovakia 2010 0.132 0.131 -0.6 0.117 0.126 0.136 16.9 
Slovenia 2010 0.125 0.124 -0.2 0.107 0.117 0.130 21.2 
Spain 2013 0.222 0.225 1.5 0.194 0.212 0.233 20.1 
Sweden 2005 0.097 0.097 -0.3 0.090 0.095 0.101 13.0 
United Kingdom 2013 0.228 0.229 0.4 0.208 0.223 0.229 10.1 
United States 2016 0.287 0.288 0.2 0.259 0.277 0.295 14.2 
Median    0.3    16.9 
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Note. Sim.1: Simulated inequality if homogamy were as in first year; Change: Percentage change between observed and Sim.1 Theil; Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing 
hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change 
when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4;  
 
Correlation of % Change of Table E4 with % Change of Table 3 0.767; Correlation of % Change 2-4 of Table E4 with % Change 2-4 of Table 3 0.987. 
 
Country Year Theil Sim. 1 Change Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.150 0.153 1.9% 0.131 0.143 0.154 17.9% 
Belgium 1997 0.105 0.102 -2.4% 0.088 0.099 0.106 20.5% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.144 0.144 0.3% 0.121 0.135 0.152 25.6% 
Denmark 2013 0.120 0.119 -1.0% 0.110 0.117 0.121 10.3% 
Estonia 2010 0.206 0.205 -0.4% 0.189 0.198 0.211 11.5% 
Finland 2013 0.125 0.125 0.4% 0.116 0.121 0.132 14.2% 
France 2010 0.177 0.183 3.2% 0.135 0.169 0.176 30.4% 
Germany 2013 0.188 0.190 0.8% 0.173 0.183 0.193 11.6% 
Greece 2010 0.202 0.196 -3.2% 0.151 0.184 0.204 35.4% 
Ireland 2010 0.166 0.169 1.4% 0.140 0.160 0.165 17.9% 
Italy 2014 0.208 0.210 0.7% 0.187 0.200 0.215 15.0% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.151 0.148 -2.0% 0.131 0.139 0.158 20.6% 
Netherlands 2013 0.132 0.138 4.8% 0.118 0.126 0.144 22.0% 
Norway 2013 0.130 0.130 0.3% 0.124 0.128 0.132 6.5% 
Poland 2013 0.234 0.232 -0.7% 0.168 0.223 0.225 33.9% 
Slovakia 2010 0.132 0.131 -0.8% 0.117 0.125 0.136 16.2% 
Slovenia 2010 0.125 0.125 0.2% 0.103 0.117 0.129 25.2% 
Spain 2013 0.222 0.225 1.6% 0.197 0.212 0.233 18.2% 
Sweden 2005 0.117 0.112 -4.6% 0.109 0.114 0.121 11.0% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.228 0.229 0.4% 0.213 0.224 0.228 7.0% 
United States 2016 0.287 0.288 0.2% 0.258 0.277 0.295 14.6% 
Median    0.3%    18.2% 
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Note. Sim. 2: Inequality when maximizing hyper- and hypogamy; Sim.3: Inequality if there were no association between partners’ educations; Sim.4: Inequality when 
maximizing homogamy; Change 2-4: % change when moving from Sim.2 to Sim.4; * 4 educational categories instead of 5. Educational categories in general refer to lower 
secondary education or less, upper secondary completed (vocational track), upper secondary completed (general track), post-secondary non-tertiary, tertiary education. In 
countries with only one upper secondary track, a distinction was in general made between short and long tertiary cycles.  
 
Correlation of % Change 2-4 of Table E5 with % Change 2-4 of Table 3 0.87 
Country Year Theil Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim .4 Change 2-4 
Austria 2010 0.1501 0.1327 0.1426 0.1549 16.7% 
Belgium 1997 0.1036 0.0832 0.0957 0.1058 27.2% 
Czech Republic 2013 0.1441 0.1243 0.1352 0.1565 25.9% 
Denmark 2013 0.1163 0.1101 0.1128 0.1154 4.8% 
Estonia 2010 0.2052 0.1970 0.1980 0.2084 5.8% 
Finland 2013 0.1245 0.1090 0.1198 0.1333 22.3% 
France 2010 0.1775 0.1269 0.1616 0.1755 38.3% 
Germany 2013 0.1916 0.1740 0.1849 0.1873 7.6% 
Greece* 2010 0.1925 0.1380 0.1726 0.1951 41.4% 
Ireland 2010 0.1665 0.1514 0.1596 0.1606 6.1% 
Italy 2014 0.2083 0.1905 0.2105 0.2124 11.5% 
Luxembourg 2013 0.1500 0.1160 0.1356 0.1509 30.1% 
Netherlands 2013 0.1319 0.1223 0.1254 0.1443 18.0% 
Norway 2013 0.1296 0.1234 0.1283 0.1304 5.7% 
Poland 2013 0.2341 0.1540 0.2115 0.2218 44.0% 
Slovakia 2010 0.1321 0.1113 0.126 0.1388 24.7% 
Slovenia* 2010 0.1247 0.1039 0.1146 0.1285 23.7% 
Spain 2013 0.222 0.210 0.2150 0.2272 8.2% 
Sweden 2005 0.0973 0.0877 0.0942 0.1021 16.4% 
United Kingdom 2013 0.228 0.2191 0.2201 0.2384 8.8% 
United States 2016 0.287 0.261 0.273 0.294 12.6% 
Median      16.7% 
